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to conduct a business; Fundamental rights; Internet service
providers; Online infringement; Proportionality; Safe
harbour; User-generated content; Web hosting
Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market1 (DSMD) and the accompanying
Recital 38 are amongst the most controversial parts of
the European Commission’s copyright reform package.
Several Members States (Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands2 and
Germany3) have submitted questions seeking clarification
on aspects that are essential to the guarantee of
fundamental rights in the EU and to the future of the
Internet as an open communication medium. The
following recommendation urges European
lawmakers—the Council and the Parliament alike—to
consider these questions seriously. In the light of the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, it offers guidelines
and background information with regard to the issues
raised by the Member States: the compatibility of the
proposed new legislationwith the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the relation with the safe harbour provisions in
arts 14 and 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, the relation
with the concept of communication to the public in art.3
of the Information Society Directive and the objective to
compensate authors and performers for the use of their
works and performances.4
Compatibility with the Charter
Question 1—Belgium, Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary and the Netherlands
“Would the standalone measure/obligation as
currently proposed under Article 13 be compatible
with the Charter of Human Rights (and more
specifically Article 11 – freedom of expression and
information, Article 8 – Protection of personal data
– and Article 16 – Freedom to conduct a business)
in the light of the jurisprudence of the CJEU that
aims to secure a fair balance in the application of
competing fundamental rights?
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Are the proposed measures justified and
proportionate?”
Question 6—Germany
“How is it possible to ensure that platforms onto
which authors upload mainly their own works, or
on which mostly public-domain works are stored,
will not be encumbered with the costs of installing
monitoring systems, should any such systems be
introduced? How can it be made clear, should this
be needed, that the provision does not apply to
platforms serving non-commercial or scientific
purposes?”
Article 13 DSMD refers to the use of “effective content
recognition technologies”. The Member States conclude
that this filtering would occur “automatically when the
identification technology finds a match with a work or
other subject-matter”. Against this background, the
Questions raised by the Member States concern the use
of content recognition technology “across a wide variety
of online services and platforms used by European
citizens” and, more specifically, the impact on platforms
hosting self-created content, public domain material and
scientific papers.
EU primary law, in particular the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR), sets direct limits
to measures which national legislators may impose on
information society service providers, including providers
of online platforms for user-uploaded content. The CJEU
has stated explicitly that in transposing EU directives and
implementing transposing measures:
“Member States must … take care to rely on an
interpretation of the directives which allows a fair
balance to be struck between the various
fundamental rights protected by the Community
legal order.”5
The application of filtering technology to a social media
platform hosting user-generated content occupied centre
stage in Sabam v Netlog. The case concerned Netlog’s
social networking platform, which offered every
subscriber the opportunity to acquire a globally available
“profile” space that could be filled with photos, texts,
video clips, etc.6 Claiming that users make unauthorised
use of music and films belonging to its repertoire, the
collective management organisation Sabam sought to
obtain an injunction obliging Netlog to install a system
for filtering the information uploaded to Netlog’s servers.
As a preventive measure, and at Netlog’s expense, this
system would apply indiscriminately to all users for an
unlimited period, and would have been capable of
identifying electronic files containing music and films
from the Sabam repertoire. In the case of a match, the
system would prevent relevant files from being made
available to the public.7
Hence, the Sabam v Netlog case offered the CJEU the
chance to provide guidance on a filtering system that
could become a standard measure if art.13 DSMD was
implemented at the national level. However, the CJEU
did not arrive at the conclusion that such a filtering system
could be deemed permissible. Instead, the CJEU saw a
serious infringement of fundamental rights. The court
took as a starting point the explicit recognition of
intellectual property as a fundamental right in art.17(2)
CFR. At the same time, the court recognised that
intellectual property must be balanced against the
protection of other fundamental rights and freedoms.8
Weighing the right to intellectual property asserted by
Sabam against Netlog’s freedom to conduct a business,
which is guaranteed under art.16 CFR, the court observed
that the filtering system would involve monitoring all or
most of the information on Netlog’s server in the interests
of copyright holders, would have no limitation in time,
would be directed at all future infringements and would
be intended to protect not only existing but also future
works.9 Given these features, the CJEU concluded that
the filtering system would encroach upon Netlog’s
freedom to conduct a business:
“Accordingly, such an injunction would result in a
serious infringement of the freedom of the hosting
service provider to conduct its business since it
would require that hosting service provider to install
a complicated, costly, permanent computer system
at its own expense, which would also be contrary to
the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive
2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure the
respect of intellectual-property rights should not be
unnecessarily complicated or costly (see, by analogy,
Scarlet Extended, paragraph 48).”10
The CJEU also found that the filtering system would
violate the fundamental rights of Netlog’s users, namely
their right to the protection of their personal data and their
freedom to receive or impart information, as safeguarded
by arts 8 and 11 CFR respectively. In particular, the
identification, systematic analysis and processing of
information connected with the user profiles on Netlog’s
social network risked amounting to a privacy infringement
in the sense of art.8 CFR. Moreover, the filtering system
could potentially undermine freedom of information, as
long as it was not capable of distinguishing adequately
between unlawful content and lawful content, with the
result that it could block lawful communications.11
5Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU (C-275/06) EU:C:2008:54; [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 17 at [68].
6 Sabam v Netlog (C-360/10) EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [16]–[18].
7 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [26] and [36]–[37].
8 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [41]–[44].
9 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [45].
10 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [46]–[47].
11 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [48]–[50].
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In this regard, the CJEU recalled that the use of
protected material in online communications may be
lawful under statutory exceptions to copyright in the
Member States, and that some works may have already
entered the public domain, or been made available for
free by the authors concerned.12Given this corrosive effect
on fundamental rights, the court concluded:
“Consequently, it must be held that, in adopting the
injunction requiring the hosting service provider to
install the contested filtering system, the national
court concerned would not be respecting the
requirement that a fair balance be struck between
the right to intellectual property, on the one hand,
and the freedom to conduct business, the right to
protection of personal data and the freedom to
receive or impart information, on the other (see, by
analogy, Scarlet Extended, paragraph 53).”13
In the light of this case law, it can hardly be concluded
that the measure/obligation proposed under art.13 DSMD
is compatible with the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed under arts 8, 11 and 16 CFR. Indeed, the
filtering system that gave rise to the Sabam v Netlog case
seems to come very close to the content recognition
measures envisaged in art.13 DSMD. TheMember States
also point out correctly in their Questions that the filtering
system may deprive users of the room for freedom of
expression that follows from statutory copyright
exceptions, in particular the quotation right14 and the right
to parody.15 As explained above, the court explicitly
confirmed this point in Sabam v Netlog. Taking all this
into account, the proposed measures do not appear
justified and proportionate under the approach followed
by the CJEU.
Admittedly, arguments have been put forth according
to which the reasoning developed by the CJEU in Sabam
v Netlog would not apply to the measures currently
proposed in the DSMD. Indeed, it is arguable that, in
some respects, art.13 DSMD represents an improvement
over the filtering system contemplated in that case. This
suggestion is most convincing as regards the provider’s
freedom to conduct a business. For one thing, art.13
explicitly envisages the involvement of right holders in
the content identification process, while Recital 39
suggests that right holders should provide the necessary
data to allow the services to identify their content. The
provider would thus only be expected to match the data
provided by the right holder against content uploaded on
to its platform. This may conceivably represent a
significant alleviation of the burden imposed on the
provider, which might otherwise have been obliged to
collect data on infringed content itself.16 In addition, it
has been suggested that, in the years since the Sabam v
Netlog decision was handed down, less expensive and
more efficient technologies have been developed for the
identification of infringing content.17
However, other research advises convincingly that
content recognition technologies remain quite expensive
for small and medium-sized businesses, particularly for
start-ups.18 Moreover, the analysis must not be confined
to the identification of infringing content. Regardless of
potential improvements in this area, the problems outlined
in Sabam v Netlog vis-à-vis arts 8 and 11 CFR remain.19
The Impact Assessment accompanying the Commission
Proposal itself acknowledges that content recognition
technologies continue to result in “false positives” (i.e.
incorrect identifications and removals of content), an
issue that is particularly pronounced as concerns
transformative content, such as parodies.20 It suggests,
however, that the procedural safeguards envisioned in
art.13(2) DSMD may mitigate this negative impact. Yet
this solution ignores the fact that the concern of the CJEU
in Sabam v Netlog was with the “blocking of lawful
communications”. The court made no indication that
put-back mechanisms are capable of sufficiently
addressing the harm caused by incorrect automatic
removals. Although complaints and redress mechanisms
can be helpful, studies have indicated that, if improperly
formulated, they may have a “chilling effect” on
end-users, who are dis-incentivised from using them to
exert their rights.21 In this regard, it is significant that, as
currently formulated, the complaints and redress
mechanisms included in art.13 remain very vaguely
sketched. It is also worth noting that a Compromise
Proposal tabled by the Council is particularly worrying,
as it would place decision-making in the case of disputes
in the hands of the right holder—a party with strong
incentives to disallow use.22
12 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [50].
13 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [51].
14 Information Society Directive 2001/29 art.5(3)(d).
15 Information Society Directive 2001/29 art.5(3)(k).
16C. Angelopoulos, “Study on Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market” (February 2017), p.38,
SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947800 [Accessed 1 January 2018].
17A. Lucas-Schloetter, “Transfer of Value Provisions of the Draft Copyright Directive” (March 2017), p.20, http://www.authorsocieties.eu/uploads/Lucas-Schloetter
%20Analysis%20Copyright%20Directive%20-%20EN.pdf [Accessed 1 January 2018].
18E. Engstrom and N. Feamster, “The Limits of Filtering: A Look at the Functionality & Shortcomings of Content Detection Tools” (March 2017), p.26, http://www.engine
.is/events/category/the-limits-of-filtering-a-look-at-the-functionality-shortcomings-of-content-detection-tools; cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, “Copyright Reform, GS Media and
Innovation Climate in the EU” (2016) 5 Tijdschrift voor Auteurs-, Media- & Informatierecht 130, SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2865258 [Both accessed 1 January
2018].
19C. Angelopoulos, “Study on Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market” (February 2017), p.38,
SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947800 [Accessed 1 January 2018].
20Commission Staff Working Document, “Impact Assessment on the Modernisation of EU Copyright Rules Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying
Down Rules on the Exercise of Copyright and Related Rights Applicable to Certain Online Transmissions of Broadcasting Organisations and Retransmissions of Television
and Radio Programmes’, SWD(2016) 301 final (Brussels, 14 September 2016), pp.140–141.
21 J. Urban, J. Karaganis and B. Schofield, “Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice”, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No.2755628 (March 2016), pp.44–46,
SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 [Accessed 1 January 2018].
22 See Presidency Compromise Proposal regarding Articles 1, 2 and 10 to 16, 2016/0280 (COD) (Brussels, 30 August 2017) art.13(2).
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Finally, it has been suggested that the measures
contemplated by art.13 DSMD would not engage art.8
CFR. It has, for example, been argued that this follows
from the fact that they would only target uploads and not
concern internet users who download or stream content,
as well as from the fact that the measures would only
focus on the content and not the identity of the person
uploading it.23Again, these arguments ignore the wording
of the Sabam v Netlog judgment which focused on “the
identification, systematic analysis and processing of
information connected with the profiles created on” the
platform by the contested filtering system. This indicates
that the system’s objective to identify content cannot
detract from the inevitable connection of that content with
the user who posted it. Similarly, there is no reason why
uploaders should not enjoy the protections afforded to
downloaders: not all uploaded content will infringe
copyright and, in its effort to uncover infringing content,
the identification systems will necessarily examine
content which does not.
This unresolved dilemma shows that art.13 DSMD is
incompatible with the guarantee of fundamental rights
and freedoms and the obligation to strike a fair balance
between all rights and freedoms involved. The current
state of the art in the field of filtering technology does
not allow the implementation of a system that could
achieve the indispensable fair balance. In addition, the
Question posed by Germany with regard to self-created
works, public domainmaterial and scientific papers sheds
light on missing nuances in art.13 DSMD and the
technology that is currently available. Platforms with
self-created works, public domain material or scientific
papers would fall under the proposed new rules and thus
be obliged to introduce filtering systems for all uploaded
material, regardless of whether this material consists of
an uploader’s own creations, unprotected works in the
public domain or papers serving the academic debate.
Also from this perspective, art.13 DSMD is
disproportionate and irreconcilable with the fundamental
rights guaranteed in the Charter.
Relation to the safe harbour for hosting
Question 2—Belgium, Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary and the Netherlands
“Is it appropriate to modify the manner in which the
Directive on electronic commerce is applied and
interpreted in a horizontal manner, in a recital in a
Directive on copyright?
Is the description in recital 38 of the current state
of play of the jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding
the eligibility of ISPs for liability exemptions under
Directive 2000/31/EC accurate and complete?”
Question 5—Germany
“Would it be possible to introduce a provision on
‘notice and takedown’ having applicability
throughout the European Union? And would such
a provision potentially be suited to likewise protect
the interests of rightholders?”
As the explanation given by the Member States shows,
these Questions concern in particular the second
paragraph of Recital 38 DSMD:
“In respect of Article 14, it is necessary to verify
whether the service provider plays an active role,
including by optimising the presentation of the
uploadedworks or subject-matter or promoting them,
irrespective of the nature of the means used
therefor.”
This paragraph seems to indicate that an active role
depriving internet service providers of the liability
privilege following from art.14 of the E-Commerce
Directive can readily be inferred from acts of optimising
the presentation of user-generated content or promoting
this content. In CJEU jurisprudence, such acts were
central to the decision in L’Oréal v eBay. To fully
understand this decision, it is necessary to consider the
factual background to the case.
The L’Oréal v eBay lawsuit arose from eBay’s practice
of assisting sellers, in some cases, to enhance their offers
for sale, set up online shops and promote and increase
their sales. More specifically, eBay had used keyword
advertising to draw the attention of consumers to certain
offers uploaded by users to its marketplace.24 A search
for “shu uemura”, for example, triggered the display of
the following eBay advertising as a sponsored search
result:
“Shu Uemura
Great deals on Shu uemura
Shop on eBay and Save!
www.ebay.co.uk.”25
When clicking on this sponsored link, internet users were
led to a page on the http://www.ebay.co.ukwebsite which
showed Shu Uemura perfume offers, including offers that
infringed L’Oréal’s trade mark rights.26Discussing eBay’s
secondary liability for trade mark infringement in this
factual context, the CJEU recalled the neutrality test
23Lucas-Schloetter, “Transfer of Value Provisions of the Draft Copyright Directive” (March 2017), p.20, http://www.authorsocieties.eu/uploads/Lucas-Schloetter%20Analysis
%20Copyright%20Directive%20-%20EN.pdf [Accessed 1 January 2018].
24 L’Oréal v eBay (C-324/09) EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [28]–[31].
25 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [40].
26 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [38]–[42].
152 European Intellectual Property Review
(2018) 40 E.I.P.R., Issue 3 © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
adopted inGoogle France,27 that is, that a hosting service
provider falls outside the scope of art.14 of the
E-Commerce Directive where it
“plays an active role of such a kind as to give it
knowledge of, or control over, those data (Google
France and Google, paragraphs 114 and 120)”.28
The CJEU then declared that:
“Where, by contrast, the operator has provided
assistance which entails, in particular, optimising
the presentation of the offers for sale in question or
promoting those offers, it must be considered not to
have taken a neutral position between the
customer-seller concerned and potential buyers but
to have played an active role of such a kind as to
give it knowledge of, or control over, the data
relating to those offers for sale. It cannot then rely,
in the case of those data, on the exemption from
liability referred to in Article 14(1) of Directive
2000/31.”29
Quite clearly, the conclusion derived from optimising the
presentation of user-generated offers, and promoting
certain offers, was thus based on specific activities carried
out by eBay—activities that implied knowledge of the
offers concerned. When referring to certain offers on the
online marketplace in its own keyword advertising, eBay
can be expected to have checked the contents of these
offers. Similarly, eBay can be expected to have obtained
knowledge of the products offered for sale on its
marketplace when it offers assistance to improve the
presentation of these offers. In contrast to these specific
circumstances of the L’Oréal v eBay case, the general
rule underlying current EU legislation is to be found in
Recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive. In L’Oréal v
eBay, the CJEU referred to this general rule before
applying it to the facts of the specific case before it:
“[I]n order for an internet service provider to fall
within the scope of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31,
it is essential that the provider be an intermediary
provider … That is not the case where the service
provider, instead of confining itself to providing that
service neutrally by amerely technical and automatic
processing of the data provided by its customers,
plays an active role of such a kind as to give it
knowledge of, or control over, those data.”
In Recital 38 DSMD, however, the general requirements
of knowledge and control are not mentioned. Instead, the
acts of “promoting” or “optimising the presentation” of
user-generated content are detached from the specific
circumstances of the L’Oréal v eBay case and presented
as isolated, self-contained assessment factors. In
consequence, the Recital gives the impression that any
act of promoting or optimising the presentation of
user-generated content automatically excludes eligibility
for the liability safe harbour established by art.14 of the
E-Commerce Directive. Recital 38 DSMD could thus
lead to an exclusion of the liability privilege that goes far
beyond the status quo reached in L’Oréal/eBay. The
particular examples of optimisation and promotion of the
uploaded offers are so linked to the particularities of
eBay’s platform that the CJEU did not state that they
would entail, in general, a lack of neutrality as a service
provider, but more specifically a lack of a “neutral
position between the customer-seller concerned and
potential buyers”.30 Furthermore, the lack of neutrality
considered by the CJEU does not imply that all the
platform’s activity falls outside the exemption of liability;
rather, the CJEU expressly limited that effect to the data
which have been so optimised or promoted, noting that
the service provider “cannot then rely, in the case of those
data, on the exemption from liability referred to in Article
14(1) of Directive 2000/31”.31
As long as Recital 38 is not aligned with the
requirement of “an active role of such a kind as to give
[the internet service provider] knowledge of, or control
over”, user-generated content, the inroads made into the
safe harbour for hosting will be considerable. Taken to
the extremes, the distinction between different categories
of content that is available on an internet platform could
already be seen as a form of “optimising the presentation”.
Similarly, the general promotion of a platform with
user-generated content could also be understood as a
relevant form of “promoting”, even if the advertising does
not refer to any specific content on the platform.
Moreover, according to the wording of the proposed
Recital, which explicitly rejects differentiations on the
basis of “the nature of the means used”, any optimisation
of the presentation of content or the promotion of content,
even through the mere provision of generic or automated
support to end-users, could be relevant. The departure
from CJEU jurisprudence is further emphasised by the
addition, in Recital 38, of the clause “irrespective of the
nature of the means used therefor”, thereby potentially
encompassing instances of optimisation and promotion
by automatic means in the absence of knowledge or
control.
27Google France Sàrl v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08) EU:C:2010:159; [2011] Bus. L.R. 1 at [113]–[114].
28 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [113].
29 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [116].
30 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [116].
31 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [116] (emphasis added).
The Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Fundamental Rights and the Open Internet 153
(2018) 40 E.I.P.R., Issue 3 © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
In comparison with the specific situation underlying
the L’Oréal v eBay decision, Recital 38 DSMD would
thus lead to a remarkable restriction of eligibility for the
liability privilege following from art.14 of the
E-Commerce Directive.32Hence, Recital 38 DSMD does
not adequately reflect the current status quo in the area
of the safe harbour for hosting following from art.14 of
the E-CommerceDirective. It takes the assessment criteria
of “promoting” and “optimising the presentation” of
user-generated content out of the specific context of the
L’Oréal v eBay case. The additional requirement that
these activities only be relevant if they lead to “knowledge
of, or control over” infringing user-generated content is
missing. This requirement, however, played a central role
in L’Oréal v eBay.33 In the absence of any reference to
this central requirement, Recital 38 DSMD is incomplete
and fails to draw an accurate picture of the current
conceptual contours of the safe harbour for hosting.
At the same time, the Commission Proposal and
subsequent Presidency Compromise Proposals confuse
and mix different legal questions by bringing together
the issue of the scope of the safe harbour for hosting under
art.14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, and the issue of
whether (and when) platform providers themselves carry
out an act of communication to the public and fulfil the
requirements of art.3(1) of the Information Society
Directive. As to the first issue, which lies at the core of
Question 2, it is worth noting that while the Commission
Proposal does not aim to replace or amend the existing
rules in the E-Commerce Directive, serious doubts arise
with regard to a potential corrosive effect of the proposed
new copyright rules on the more general rules laid down
in art.14 of the E-Commerce Directive. As discussed, the
description in Recital 38 DSMD of the current state of
play of the CJEU jurisprudence regarding the eligibility
of providers of hosting services for liability exemptions
under the E-Commerce Directive is inaccurate and
incomplete. Moreover, the Commission Proposal does
not contain any explanation or definition of the concept
of service providers, which are to be qualified as
“information society service providers that store and
provide to the public access to large amounts of works
or other subject-matter uploaded by their users” in the
context of art.13(1) DSMD. It also remains unclear how
the criterion of “large amounts” should be applied and
how much weight it should have in the assessment.
These conclusions shed light on the need to clarify
service provider immunity instead of further complicating
the legal assessment criteria. A further clarification of the
applicable rules should extend the principle that is already
reflected in the EU acquis, namely that providers are not
liable for users’ actions which they cannot reasonably be
expected to know and control.34 A further clarification of
this rule is advisable to pave the way for a uniform
application of service provider immunity throughout the
internal market. In the interest of legal certainty and a
higher level of harmonisation, a well-structured European
legislative design of the “notice and takedown” procedure
should be introduced, accompanied by an appropriate
“counter notice” procedure.35
Relation to the prohibition of general
monitoring obligations
Question 3—Belgium, Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary and the Netherlands
“Is Article 15 of the Directive on electronic
commerce to be understood that the prohibition for
Member States to impose general monitoring
obligations does not apply in the situation where
Member States’ legislation would oblige certain
platforms to apply technology that identifies and
filters all the data of each of its users before the
upload on the publically available services?”
Question 2—Germany
“How do Article 13 and Recital 38 of the draft relate
to the liability privileges for service providers that
have been established in the Directive on electronic
commerce (2000/31/EC)? How could Article 13 of
the draft be put in more clear terms?”
The implementation of art.13 DSMD would lead to the
application of content recognition technology to
user-generated content platforms. Article 13 DSMD
generally refers to “[i]nformation society service
32 For examples of national case law reflecting the broader application of the safe harbour for hosting under current legislation, see French Cour de cassation (Chambre
commerciale, financière et économique), 13 July 2010, Google France v Louis Vuitton Malletier (06-20.230); Google France v GIFAM (08-13944); Google France v
CNRRH (06-15136); Google France v SA Viaticum (05-14331), where the court annulled the lower courts’ rulings that rejected immunity as having employed the wrong
criterion in examining Google’s advertising activities and confirmed that protection from liability as a hosting service provider depends on whether the intermediary has
played an active role of such a kind as to convey knowledge or control over the stored information; Court de cassation, 17 February 2011, Sté Nord-Ouest v Dailymotion
(09-67.896), where the court explicitly acknowledged that “the sale of advertising space does not imply the service’s ability to act in relation to the uploaded content”. The
court also noted that the implementation of technical means ensuring the content’s compatibility with the viewing interface and limiting the size of posted files for reasons
of optimisation of the server’s integration capacity are mere technical operations that are part of the essence of a hosting service and in no way imply that the provider is
involved in the selection of uploaded content. The same was said about the provision of presentation frames and of tools for the classification of content, which are necessary
for the organisation of the service and in order to facilitate user access to the content; England and Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Tixdaq Ltd [2016] EWHC 575; [2016] Bus.
L.R. 641, which concerned the liability of the operators of a Vine-inspired mobile application which allowed users to upload and add commentary to screen-captured
eight-second clips of broadcast footage. The question arose whether the operators were protected by the safe harbours. No final conclusion was reached with regard to the
hosting safe harbour. However, based on L’Oréal v eBay, the judge did offer the provisional view that this defence would only be available in respect of user-posted clips
which were not editorially reviewed by the defendants, but not in respect of clips which were editorially reviewed.
33 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [116].
34 See E-Commerce Directive arts 12 to 14, which establish this principle.
35 For a more detailed elaboration of this point, see Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Position Statement (September 2017), pp.99–113, paras 42–46,
SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3036787 [Accessed 1 January 2018]. For a comparison with the US safe harbour system which includes the
possibility of counter-notices, see M. Peguera, “The DMCA Safe Harbour and Their European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems” (2009)
32 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 481.
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providers that store and provide to the public access to
large amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded
by their users”. This seems to encompass blogging
platforms, news portals working with citizen journalists
and/or offering discussion fora, photo/film/music portals,
social networking sites, online marketplaces and search
engines offering keyword advertising services. Therefore,
the Member States conclude that the adoption of art.13
DSMDwould lead to the application of filteringmeasures
“across a wide variety of online services and platforms
used by European citizens”, and that filtering would occur
“automatically when the identification technology finds
a match with a work or other subject-matter”.
As to the question whether the obligations following
from art.13 DSMDwould amount to a general monitoring
obligation in the sense of art.15 of the E-Commerce
Directive, the CJEU made the following statement in
L’Oréal v eBay:
“First, it follows from Article 15(1) of Directive
2000/31, in conjunction with Article 2(3) of
Directive 2004/48, that the measures required of the
online service provider concerned cannot consist in
an active monitoring of all the data of each of its
customers in order to prevent any future
infringement of intellectual property rights via that
provider’s website. Furthermore, a general
monitoring obligation would be incompatible with
Article 3 of Directive 2004/48, which states that the
measures referred to by the directive must be fair
and proportionate and must not be excessively
costly.”36
As explained above, L’Oréal v eBay concerned eBay’s
online marketplace and, therefore, a platform hosting
user-generated content in the sense of the proposed art.13
DSMD. Hence, there can be little doubt that according
to the CJEU, art.15 of the E-Commerce Directive is fully
applicable to user-generated content platforms and
intended to shield these platforms from general
monitoring obligations. In the aforementioned case Sabam
v Netlog, this point comes to the fore even more clearly.
With regard to Netlog’s social networking site, the CJEU
repeated its earlier ruling in Scarlet v Sabam that an
obligation to filter any information uploaded to Netlog’s
server would lead to the imposition of a general
monitoring obligation and be incompatible with art.15 of
the E-Commerce Directive:
“In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that
the injunction imposed on the hosting service
provider requiring it to install the contested filtering
system would oblige it to actively monitor almost
all the data relating to all of its service users in order
to prevent any future infringement of
intellectual-property rights. It follows that that
injunctionwould require the hosting service provider
to carry out general monitoring, something which
is prohibited by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31
(see, by analogy, Scarlet Extended, paragraph 40).”37
It is to be noted, however, that arguments have beenmade
in favour of a different interpretation of “general
monitoring”. It has, for example, been suggested that
“general monitoring can only be understood as searching
for all potentially illegal content. Therefore, it does not
apply when the infringing content to be searched for is
identified”.38 According to this interpretation, art.15 of
the E-Commerce Directive prohibits the “permanent,
systematic monitoring of all hosted content, with no prior
identification of what to search for”.39
This approach, however, cannot be accepted as correct.
Notably, Sabam v Netlog also concerned the application
of a content recognition mechanism only to the repertoire
of a single claimant,40 and nevertheless the system was
found to require the hosting service provider to carry out
general monitoring. Certainly, no indication was given
in that ruling that specific content from within Sabam’s
repertoire was to be notified to the provider. Yet the CJEU
ignored the broadness of the injunction in terms of the
content which it sought to protect and focused exclusively
on the breadth of the material being monitored. It thus
noted that the system examined would
“require active observation of files stored by users
with the hosting service provider and would involve
almost all of the information thus stored and all of
the service users of that provider”.41
It was on this basis that the court found a violation of
art.15 of the E-Commerce Directive.
Doubts may be cast on the validity of this interpretation
owing to the focus in Sabam v Netlog on the prevention
of “any future infringement”. This might suggest that the
case allows for monitoring geared towards preventing
specific future infringements, i.e. the future infringement
of specific works. In McFadden, however, the CJEU
clarified this issue. There, the court stated that art.15(1)
of the E-Commerce Directive “excludes the imposition
of a general obligation on, inter alia, communication
network access providers to monitor the information that
they transmit”.42No qualification regarding the specificity
of the material for the protection of which the measure
would be employed was made. This is significant given
that the question submitted to the court made it clear that
the contemplated measure would involve “examining all
36 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [139].
37 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [38].
38Lucas-Schloetter, “Transfer of Value Provisions of the Draft Copyright Directive” (March 2017), p.19, http://www.authorsocieties.eu/uploads/Lucas-Schloetter%20Analysis
%20Copyright%20Directive%20-%20EN.pdf [Accessed 1 January 2018].
39Lucas-Schloetter, “Transfer of Value Provisions of the Draft Copyright Directive” (March 2017), p.19, http://www.authorsocieties.eu/uploads/Lucas-Schloetter%20Analysis
%20Copyright%20Directive%20-%20EN.pdf [Accessed 1 January 2018].
40 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [23].
41 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [37].
42McFadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (C-484/14) EU:C:2016:689; [2017] Bus. L.R. 430 at [87]; Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC v Delta Center as
(C-494/15) EU:C:2016:528; [2016] Bus. L.R. 1008 at [34].
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communications passing through [the provider’s systems]
in order to ascertain whether the particular
copyright-protected work is unlawfully transmitted
again”.43 While that case concerned an internet access
provider (specifically aWi-Fi provider), there is no reason
why a different conclusion would apply to online
platforms. CJEU jurisprudence does not support a
distinction between general filtering obligations imposed
on internet access providers and general filtering
obligations imposed on user-generated content platforms.
As the identical considerations in the cases Scarlet
Extended v Sabam and Sabam v Netlog demonstrate,44
the court rejected a general filtering obligation with regard
to both types of service providers: internet access
providers (Scarlet Extended v Sabam) and user-generated
content platforms (Sabam v Netlog) alike.
Relation to the concept of
communication to the public
Question 4—Belgium, Czech Republic,
Finland, Hungary and the Netherlands
“Under the premise that it was not the intention of
the Commission proposal to modify the notion of
communication to the public, does the Legal Service
consider it is sufficient to ‘provide access to the
public’ to a copyrighted work to constitute an act of
communication to the public under Directive
2001/29, or does the CJEU require that further
conditions be met to establish a communication to
the public?”
Question 1—Germany
“To what extent are the actions by the service
providers set out in Article 13 paragraph 1 of the
draft governed, already under applicable law, by the
right of communication to the public within the
meaning of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive – and
all the more so in light of the most recent
adjudication by the CJEU, inter alia in the legal
matter C-527/15 (Filmspeler), legal matter C-160/15
(GS Media) and legal matter C-610/15 (The Pirate
Bay)?”
These Questions shed light on the ambiguity of the first
paragraph of Recital 38 DSMD:
“Where information society service providers store
and provide access to the public to copyright
protected works or other subject-matter uploaded
by their users, thereby going beyond the mere
provision of physical facilities and performing an
act of communication to the public, they are obliged
to conclude licensing agreements with rightholders,
unless they are eligible for the liability exemption
provided in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council.”
The Questions are based on an understanding of the word
“thereby” in the sense of indicating an automatic
consequence: if information society service providers
store and provide access to user-generated content, they
inevitably do more than providing physical facilities and
in fact perform an act of communication to the public. In
recent years, the CJEU has developed a complex factor
analysis to determine whether an act of providing access
to a work in the digital environment can be qualified as
an act of communication to the public. In the light of this
case law, it becomes clear that a relevant act of
communication to the public cannot readily be inferred
from the mere act of providing access.
In Svensson, the CJEU held that for an “act of
communication” within the meaning of art.3 of the
Information Society Directive, it was sufficient that a
work was made available to a public in such a way that
the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective
of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity.
Applying this assessment standard, the court concluded
that the use of hyperlinks to content that was freely
available on the internet with the copyright holder’s
consent constituted such an “act of communication”.45 In
GSMedia, the CJEU confirmed this approach with regard
to hyperlinks to content that was made available without
the consent of the copyright holder. In this context, the
court referred to the more general criterion of an
“intervention” seeking to give customers access to a
protected work where, in the absence of such intervention,
customers would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the
affected work.46 In the more recent Brein (Filmspeler)
decision, the CJEU added that the provision of a
multimedia player containing pre-installed add-ons with
hyperlinks to unauthorised audio-visual content offered
its users direct access to protected works without the
consent of copyright holders and, therefore, had to be
regarded as an “act of communication”.47 Finally, the
court held in Brein (Pirate Bay) that, as a rule, any act
by which a user, with full knowledge of the relevant facts,
provided its clients with access to protected works was
liable to constitute an “act of communication” for the
purposes of art.3 of the Information Society Directive.48
Against this background, the court was satisfied that the
making available and management of an online
file-sharing platform, such as The Pirate Bay, had to be
considered an “act of communication”.49
43McFadden EU:C:2016:689; [2017] Bus. L.R. 430 at [33], question 10.
44See Scarlet Extended SA v Sabam (C-70/10) EU:C:2011:771; [2012] E.C.D.R. 4 at [39]–40], on the one hand, and Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18
at [37]–[38], on the other hand.
45 Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12) EU:C:2014:76; [2014] Bus. L.R. 259 at [17]–20].
46GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (C-160/15) EU:C:2016:644; [2016] Bus. L.R. 1231 at [35].
47 Stichting Brein v Wullems (t/a Filmspeler) (C-527/15) EU:C:2017:300; [2017] Bus. L.R. 1816 at [42].
48 Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV (The Pirate Bay) (C-610/15) EU:C:2017:456; [2017] Bus. L.R. 1899 at [34].
49 The Pirate Bay EU:C:2017:456; [2017] Bus. L.R. 1899 at [37]–[39].
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However, it must not be overlooked that the court
applied the test of providing access to protected works
only as a first step in the analysis. An “act of
communication” is not alone sufficient for a finding of
infringement. Instead, an infringement of the exclusive
right granted in art.3 of the Information Society Directive
requires more than a mere “act of communication”,
namely an “act of communication to the public”. In the
light of this more complex requirement, the CJEU
established the rule that the infringement analysis required
an “individual assessment” of the circumstances of each
case.50 This individual assessment involves further steps
complementing the first, preliminary, step of ascertaining
an “act of communication”. Not surprisingly, these further
steps can lead to the conclusion that, even though an “act
of communication” has taken place, the use does not
amount to infringement, because other criteria are not
fulfilled.
In Svensson, for instance, the act of communication
based on the use of hyperlinks was finally found
permissible because a relevant new public (that could be
distinguished from the public already having access to
the initial online publication carried out by the copyright
holder) was missing.51 InGSMedia, the court introduced
a nuanced approach to hyperlinks relating to illegal online
content. In such a case, the knowledge of the person
posting the hyperlink will be a decisive factor. The court
stated that, in the framework of the indispensable
“individual assessment”, it is necessary, in the case of
hyperlinks not provided for profit, to take account of the
fact that the user did not know and could not reasonably
know that the affected work had been published on the
internet without the consent of the copyright holder.52 In
contrast, where it is established that the hyperlinker knew
or ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted
provided access to a work illegally placed on the internet,
for example as a result of a notification by the copyright
holder, it is necessary to consider whether the provision
of that link constitutes not only an “act of
communication”, but also an “act of communication to
the public” within the meaning of art.3 of the Information
Society Directive.53 Similarly, in Filmspeler, the court
focused on the individual circumstances of the case and
the degree of knowledge. In this case, the finding of
infringement rested, in particular, on the fact that the sale
of the “Filmspeler” multimedia player had been made in
full knowledge of the facts that pre-installed add-ons
containing hyperlinks gave access to works published
illegally on the internet; that the advertising of the
multimedia player had specifically referred to this option
of watching unauthorised online content on a television
screen; that the multimedia player was supplied with a
view to making a profit; and that the price for the
multimedia player was being paid in particular to obtain
direct access to protected works available on streaming
websites without the consent of copyright holders.54
Finally, in The Pirate Bay, the court deemed it decisive
that a large number of subscribers to the internet access
providers Ziggo and XS4ALL had downloaded media
files using the file-sharing platform The Pirate Bay; that
the operators of The Pirate Bay were claiming, on their
online sharing platform, to have several dozens of millions
of “peers”; that the file-sharing activities were aimed at
an indeterminate number of potential recipients and
involved a large number of persons; that the operators of
The Pirate Bay could not have been unaware of the fact
that their platform provided access to unauthorised works;
and that they ran the file-sharing platform to obtain a
profit.55
Considering the additional criteria established in these
cases—ranging from the requirement of a “new public”
to “knowledge”, and the existence of a “profit motive”
that presumes that knowledge—it becomes apparent that,
indeed, the mere act of storing and providing access to
the public is not sufficient to establish an infringement
of art.3 of the Information Society Directive. If Recital
38 DSMD is understood to merely require an act of
storing and providing access to the public, it would cut
off various additional infringement criteria that have
evolved in CJEU jurisprudence. Because of the described
ambiguity of Recital 38 DSMD, there is a real risk of
considerably modifying the notion of “communication
to the public” flowing from decisions of the CJEU.56
To avoid this result, it would be necessary to clarify
the wording of Recital 38 DSMD. In particular, it should
be made clear that the requirement of “providing access
to the public” and “performing an act of communication
to the public” are two separate and cumulative
requirements which must both be fulfilled to establish an
infringement of the exclusive right granted in art.3 of the
Information Society Directive. Following this approach,
the requirement of “providing access to the public” would
reflect the first, preliminary, CJEU test of an
“intervention”, whereas the further requirement of
“performing an act of communication to the public”
would reflect additional tests evolving from CJEU
jurisprudence, such as the criterion of a “new public”,
“knowledge” and a “profit motive”—the latter as a vehicle
for a presumption of knowledge. In this way, Recital 38
50GS Media EU:C:2014:76; [2014] Bus. L.R. 259 at [33]; Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300; [2017] Bus. L.R. 1816 at [28]; The Pirate Bay EU:C:2017:456; [2017] Bus. L.R.
1899 at [23].
51 Svensson EU:C:2014:76; [2014] Bus. L.R. 259 at [27]–[29].
52GS Media EU:C:2014:76; [2014] Bus. L.R. 259 at [47].
53GS Media EU:C:2014:76; [2014] Bus. L.R. 259 at [49].
54Filmspeler EU:C:2017:300; [2017] Bus. L.R. 1816 at [50]–[51].
55 The Pirate Bay EU:C:2017:456; [2017] Bus. L.R. 1899 at [42]–[46].
56 It must be noted that this jurisprudence may come up with even more nuances and conditions regarding the situation where the work is not merely linked to but also
stored. In this vein, a referral pending before the CJEU is asking the court whether “the inclusion of a work—which is freely accessible to all internet users on a third-party
website with the consent of the copyright holder—on a person’s own publicly accessible website constitutes a making available of that work to the public within the meaning
of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC if the work is first copied onto a server and is uploaded from there to that person’s own website”. See Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
v Renckhoff (C-161/17)).
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DSMD could be brought into line with the approach taken
by the court and a modification of the notion of
“communication to the public” could be avoided.
As a result, the Questions raised by theMember States
could be answered in the sense that: (1) to “provide access
to the public” is not sufficient to find a communication
to the public, as the CJEU requires further conditions to
be met; (2) the first paragraph of Recital 38 should either
be drafted in the way noted above, or simply deleted; and
(3) the current wording of Recital 38 does lead to legal
uncertainty.
From a more general perspective, it has to be added
that the broadening of the right of communication to the
public (and corresponding copyright liability) does not
constitute an appropriate compensatory measure for the
lack of a harmonised system of intermediary liability,
including rules on notice and takedown procedures and
a system of counter-notices. The attempt to regulate
intermediary liability on the basis of rules concerning
primary copyright infringement is inconsistent and
imbalanced: the Information Society Directive was never
intended to harmonise liability questions arising from
intermediary services, such as the services of online
platforms hosting user-generated content. Not
surprisingly, the Information Society Directive does not
provide for the checks and balances necessary to achieve
a proper equilibrium of all fundamental rights and
freedoms involved.
Fair compensation of authors and
performers
Question 3—Germany
“How can it be assured that authors and performers
obtain a reasonable share of the income resulting
from the online use of the content they have created?
Are there any legal concerns against providing for
a direct claim to remuneration for authors and
performers?”
While the objective of the Commission Proposal to give
right holders a fair share of the profit accruing from the
online dissemination of their works is laudable, it would
be wrong to adopt the concrete legal measures proposed
in art.13 and Recitals 37 to 39 DSMD to reach this goal.
If the proposal became applicable law, it would lead to
considerable legal uncertainty. As discussed, it contains
imbalanced, undefined legal concepts that make it
incompatible with the existing acquis.
Given this result of the analysis, it is advisable to
ensure an adequate remuneration of authors and
performers in a different way. In the light of the existing
acquis, it is surprising that the Commission Proposal is
silent on an alternative approach that would lead to an
additional revenue stream for authors and performers in
line with the current EU copyright system: the adoption
of a new exception to copyright covering the creation of
content remixes and mash-ups by users and the further
dissemination of these remixes and mash-ups via online
platforms for user-uploaded content.57Article 5 of the
Information Society Directive shows clearly that it is
already established EU practice to combine the adoption
of certain use privileges with an obligation to pay fair
compensation. The private copying rules in art.5(2)(a)
and (b), for example, depend on whether “the rightholders
receive fair compensation”. Similarly, the broadcasting
rule concerning social institutions which is laid down in
art.5(2)(e) of the Information Society Directive only
applies “on condition that the rightholders receive fair
compensation”. Recital 35 of the Information Society
Directive explains this:
“In certain cases of exceptions or limitations,
rightholders should receive fair compensation to
compensate them adequately for the use made of
their protected works or other subject-matter. When
determining the form, detailed arrangements and
possible level of such fair compensation, account
should be taken of the particular circumstances of
each case. When evaluating these circumstances, a
valuable criterion would be the possible harm to the
rightholders resulting from the act in question. In
cases where rightholders have already received
payment in some other form, for instance as part of
a licence fee, no specific or separate payment may
be due. The level of fair compensation should take
full account of the degree of use of technological
protection measures referred to in this Directive. In
certain situations where the prejudice to the
rightholder would be minimal, no obligation for
payment may arise.”
Hence, it would not be inconsistent with the existing
acquis to introduce a new use privilege in favour of the
creation of content remixes and mash-ups by users and
the further dissemination of these remixes and mash-ups
on online platforms. As a counter-move, online platforms
with user-uploaded content could be responsible for the
payment of fair compensation. They could either pass on
these additional costs to their users, or use a part of their
57For an example of such a specific use privilege for user-generated content, see art.29.21 of the Copyright Act of Canada, as introduced by Bill C-11, CopyrightModernization
Act, adopted on 18 June 2012. As to the general debate on user-generated content and the need for copyright exceptions in this area, see S.D. Jamar, “Crafting Copyright
Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context” (2010) 19 Widener Law Journal 843; N. Helberger and L. Guibault et
al., “Legal Aspects of User Created Content”, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law (2009), SSRN, http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1499333 [Accessed 1 January 2018];
M.W.S. Wong, “Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?” (2009) 11 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and
Technology Law 1075; E. Lee, “Warming Up to User-Generated Content” [2008] University of Illinois Law Review 1459; B. Buckley, “SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright
Infringement” (2008) 31 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 235; T.W. Bell, “The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors: How User-Generated Content Affects
Copyright Policy” (2008) 10 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 841; S. Hechter, “User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One
– Investiture of Ownership” (2008) 10 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 863; G. Lastowka, “User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds” (2008)
10 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 893.
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advertising income to finance the payment of fair
compensation.58 This alternative solution is clearly
preferable. It is in line with the current acquis and
generates an additional revenue stream for authors and
performers without encroaching upon fundamental rights
and freedoms and eroding the safe harbour for hosting in
art.14 of the E-Commerce Directive.
Conclusion
The measures contemplated in art.13 DSMD can hardly
be deemed compatible with the fundamental rights and
freedoms guaranteed under arts 8 (protection of personal
data), 11 (freedom of expression) and 16 (freedom to
conduct a business) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the EU. The application of filtering systems that would
result from the adoption of art.13 DSMD would place a
disproportionate burden on platform providers, in
particular small and medium-sized operators, and lead to
the systematic screening of personal data, even in cases
where no infringing content is uploaded. The filtering
systems would also deprive users of the room for freedom
of expression that follows from statutory copyright
exceptions, in particular the quotation right59 and the right
to parody.60
The adoption of Recital 38 DSMD would moreover
lead to a remarkable restriction of eligibility for the
liability privilege following from art.14 of the
E-Commerce Directive. Recital 38 DSMD does not
adequately reflect the current status quo in the area of the
safe harbour for hosting laid down by art.14 E-Commerce
Directive. Instead, it takes the assessment criteria of
“promoting” and “optimising the presentation” of
user-generated content out of the specific context of the
L’Oréal v eBay decision of the Court of Justice. The
general requirement of “knowledge of, or control over”
infringing user-generated content is missing. In the
absence of any reference to this central requirement,
Recital 38 DSMD is incomplete and fails to draw an
accurate picture of the current conceptual contours of the
safe harbour for hosting.
Furthermore, there can be little doubt that according
to the Court of Justice, art.15 of the E-Commerce
Directive is fully applicable to user-generated content
platforms and intended to shield these platforms from
general monitoring obligations. The court’s jurisprudence
shows clearly that an obligation to filter any information
uploaded to the server of a platform hosting
user-generated content would lead to a prohibited general
monitoring obligation and be incompatible with art.15 of
the E-Commerce Directive.
In general, the Commission Proposal and subsequent
Council Presidency Compromise Proposals confuse and
mix up different legal questions by bringing together the
issue of the scope of the safe harbour for hosting under
art.14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, and the issue of
whether (and when) platform providers themselves carry
out an act of communication to the public and fulfil the
requirements of art.3(1) of the Information Society
Directive.
Considering the criteria which the Court of Justice
developed in the context of art.3(1) of the Information
Society Directive, it becomes moreover apparent that the
mere act of storing and providing access to the public is
not sufficient to establish copyright infringement. Recital
38 would dismiss additional infringement criteria that
have evolved in the jurisprudence of the court. Because
of the ambiguous wording of Recital 38 DSMD, there is
a real risk of modifying the notion of “communication to
the public” considerably.
These findings shed light on the need to clarify service
provider immunity instead of further complicating the
legal assessment criteria. A further clarification of
applicable rules should extend the principle that is already
reflected in the EU acquis, namely that providers are not
liable for users’ actions which they cannot reasonably be
expected to know and control.61 A further clarification of
this rule is advisable to pave the way for a uniform
application of service provider immunity throughout the
internal market. In the interest of legal certainty and a
higher level of harmonisation, a well-structured European
legislative design of the “notice and takedown” procedure
should be introduced, accompanied by an appropriate
“counter notice” procedure.
In addition, it would be consistent with the existing
acquis to introduce a new use privilege in favour of the
creation of content remixes and mash-ups by users and
the further dissemination of these remixes and mash-ups
on online platforms. As a counter-move, online platforms
with user-uploaded content could be responsible for the
payment of fair compensation. They could either pass on
these additional costs to their users, or use a part of their
advertising income to finance the payment of fair
compensation. To generate an additional revenue stream
for authors and performers, this alternative solution is
clearly preferable. It does not encroach upon fundamental
rights and freedoms, and leaves intact the safe harbour
for hosting in art.14 of the E-Commerce Directive.
58 For a proposal pointing in this direction and modelled on the existing system for the payment of private copying levies, see M. Leistner and A. Metzger, “Wie sich das
Problem illegaler Musiknutzung lösen lässt” (4 January 2017), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/gema-youtube-wie-sich
-urheberrechts-streit-schlichten-liesse-14601949-p2.html [Accessed 1 January 2018]; M. Leistner, “Copyright law on the internet in need of reform: hyperlinks, online
platforms and aggregators” (2017) 12(2) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 146.
59 Information Society Directive 2001/29 art. 5(3)(d).
60 Information Society Directive 2001/29 5(3)(k).
61 See E-Commerce Directive arts 12–14, which establish this principle.
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The Recommendation on Measures to
Safeguard Fundamental Rights and the
Open Internet in the Framework of the
EU Copyright Reform
The Signatories,
• Acknowledging that, in the light of the
practical importance of an appropriate legal
framework for the production of rich and
diverse creative content and innovative
online services, it is a laudable objective to
clarify and further harmonize the rules for
the hosting and provision of access to
content uploaded by users, and reward
authors and performers for the online use
of their creations;
• Emphasising, however, that such
clarification and harmonisation should aim
to further develop the existing acquis in a
consistent way, as that emerges from the
E-Commerce Directive,62 the Information
Society Directive,63 the interpretative case
law of the CJEU and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU, by devising
an appropriate interface between potential
new legal standards in the field of copyright
and the acquis;
• Pointing out that current Commission and
Council proposals concerning the text of
Article 13 DSMD and accompanying
Recitals entail the risk of a serious
encroachment upon fundamental rights and
freedoms, in particular the rights and
freedoms laid down in Articles 8, 11 and
16 of the Charter, and that these proposals
disregard CJEU jurisprudencewhich leaves
no doubt about the need to establish a fair
balance between all fundamental rights and
freedoms involved;
• Recalling that EU policy makers are bound
by the fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed under the Charter and obliged
to strike a fair balance between all rights
and freedoms involved, in particular in light
of the principle of proportionality;
• Underscoring that it is indispensable to give
a clear and sound reason for imposing legal
obligations on information society service
providers that store and provide access to
user-uploaded works;
• Recalling that current EU legislation in the
field of information society service
providers, including Article 14 of the
E-Commerce Directive, concerns the
regulation of immunity from liability, but
not the regulation of liability. These
different notions should not be mixed.
Considering the complexity of the various
other copyright issues addressed in the
current reform debate, it is doubtful whether
the EU copyright reform is an appropriate
forum to also tackle the highly complex
issues arising from platform liability
questions which have strong repercussions
outside the field of copyright law;
• Emphasising that the notion of “monitoring
obligations in a specific case” reflected in
Recital 47 of the E-Commerce Directive
should not be overstretched to justify acts
of filtering which would target all content
uploaded onto a given platform and apply
indiscriminately to all users, even if the
filtering seeks only to identify instances of
infringement of an individual item of
protected content. In line with CJEU
jurisprudence, monitoring should be
deemed specific only if it relates to a
specific content item, in respect of which
infringement has been established
previously, or if it targets a specific user
who has previously been found to have
engaged in such infringements64;
• Warning against the erosion of the nuanced
requirements that have evolved in the case
law of the CJEU with regard to the
eligibility of information society service
providers for invoking the safe harbour for
hosting laid down in Article 14 of the
E-Commerce Directive. In particular, it is
not advisable to depart from an analysis
based on knowledge and control as
assessment factors.Moreover, case-specific
notions, such as the reference to
“optimising the presentation” and
“promoting” in L’Oréal v eBay,65 should
not be taken out of the specific context in
which the Court applied them;
• Stressing that new legislation which
disregards the nuanced approach adopted
by the CJEU is likely to generally deprive
user-uploaded content platforms of the
liability privilege following from Article
14 of the E-Commerce Directive. The
corrosive effect of such legislation would
be felt across the whole spectrum of
relevant services: from online marketplaces
and social media platforms to collaborative
62Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce)
[2000] OJ L178/1.
63Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] O.J. L167/10.
64 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [138]–[141];McFadden EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [87]; Tommy Hilfiger EU:C:2016:528;
[2016] Bus. L.R. 1008 at [34].
65 L’Oréal v eBay EU:C:2011:474; [2012] Bus. L.R. 1369 at [116].
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software development platforms66and
repositories of public domain material and
scientific papers. It would render the safe
harbour for hosting meaningless, destroy
the equilibrium between affected
fundamental rights and freedoms, erode the
basis for investment in new online services
– particularly new services developed by
small and medium-sized enterprises – and,
in consequence, lead to further market
concentration in favour of providers which
already have a strong market position;
• Pointing out the need to further clarify the
criteria for the exemption of information
society service providers from liability for
infringing content to arrive at a uniform
application of Article 14 of the
E-Commerce Directive throughout the
internal market. This further clarification
should lead to more specific, harmonized
rules on the “notice and takedown”
procedure and include the introduction of
a “counter notice” procedure. However,
there should be no liability for user action
which platform providers cannot reasonably
be expected to know and control;
• Emphasising that filteringmechanisms have
not currently advanced to the state where
they can adequately distinguish material
that should be allowed in accordance with
the exceptions and limitations to copyright.
Their use thus risks encroachments upon
freedom of expression and information. The
most sophisticated systems that do currently
exist are expensive and require substantial
investment. EU platform providers,
particularly small and medium-sized
platform operators, should not be
disadvantaged through the imposition of
obligations to invest in filtering systems or
due to an inability to purchase the most
advanced systems. It should also be noted
that all filtering requires examination of
content posted by non-infringing users,
which could negatively impact end users’
right to privacy;
• Emphasising that any reform of the safe
harbour for hosting laid down in Article 14
of the E-Commerce Directive should seek
to follow a balanced approach, distributing
new legal obligations appropriately
between providers of platforms with
user-uploaded content and copyright
holders. In particular, new legislation in
this area should create sufficient incentives
for copyright holders to set up workable
rights clearance systemswith pan-European
reach;
• Recalling that in the light of CJEU
jurisprudence, the assumption that acts of
hosting and providing access, generally,
amount to an act of communication to the
public that requires the authorization of
copyright holders is not always correct. The
CJEU has developed a complex set of
conditions for identifying acts of
communication to the public. Given the
diversity of affected online services and
forms of use, new legislation in this area
should refrain from collapsing the different
assessment criteria into one single test of
providing access. Instead, it is desirable to
distinguish clearly between infringement
criteria that apply to the primary act of
uploading content, and those that apply to
the secondary acts undertaken in relation
to uploaded content;
• Emphasising that, in order to avoid an
encroachment upon freedom of expression
and information, it is indispensable to
safeguard limitations and exceptions to
copyright protection when it comes to the
use of filtering mechanisms, as explained
by the CJEU in Scarlet Extented v Sabam67
and Sabam v Netlog.68 To this end, the
introduction of obligations for platform
providers based on content recognition
technologies should not be attempted before
these limitations and exceptions have been
properly harmonized at EU level;
• Pointing out that the introduction of a new
copyright limitation permitting the
uploading and further dissemination of
user-generated remixes and mash-ups of
protected content, as is usual practice in
social networks, could play an important
role in alleviating the problems currently
embedded in Article 13 and Recital 38
DSMD. Such a new copyright limitation69
would offer a sound basis for the payment
of equitable remuneration which could
become an additional source of income for
authors and performers. The adoption of a
new copyright limitation is also appropriate
considering that not only platform
66OpenForum Europe and Free Software Foundation Europe, “European Copyright reform: Impact on Free and Open Source Software and developer communities”
(September 2017), http://www.openforumeurope.org/release-ofe-fsfe-paper-european-copyright-reform-impact-free-open-source-software-developer-communities/ [Accessed
1 January 2018].
67 Scarlet Extended v Sabam EU:C:2011:771; [2012] E.C.D.R. 4 at [52].
68 Sabam v Netlog EU:C:2012:85; [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 18 at [50].
69For a further discussion of the conceptual contours of such a new copyright limitation, see Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
(Munich 2017), pp.99–113, SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3036787 [Accessed 1 January 2018].
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providers, but also copyright holders and
users, should contribute to the development
of adequate solutions;
• Pointing out that any legislation leading to
the use of content filtering mechanisms
must ensure that courts have the
opportunity to exercise effective control to
prevent excesses. The decision over the
scope and reach of filtering measures must
not be left to agreements between industry
representatives that are likely to focus on
cost and efficiency considerations instead
of seeking to avoid unnecessary content
censorship. The involvement of the courts
can ensure sufficient deference to public
interests, such as the maintenance of an
equilibrium between all rights and freedoms
involved. Courts can also give sufficient
weight to the interests of end consumers
which are not represented in negotiations
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